" Although it is too early to offer some meaningful perspective on the impact of the revelations of WikiLeaks American foreign policy is not too early to think about what they say diplomatic messages that slipped on the public's understanding of how diplomacy works.
WikiLeaks The justification for disclosing confidential material from the State Department is that while the public more aware about how the government conducts its foreign policy, the better the outcome of the application. This is an old idea: Woodrow Wilson advocated "opening clauses of peace, openly negotiated." But history also shows that open diplomacy often ends up being fatally flawed.
The secret is an essential part of any negotiation: no merger, complex legal transaction, amicable divorce or serious political agreement can be reached any time without a reliable level of confidentiality.
But in no other area is more essential secrecy in foreign relations. For example, if the various diplomats who negotiated the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany would have had to deal with public revelations about the disagreements, half-baked proposals and reckless language of internal communications - as Margaret Thatcher's opposition to German unification versus the determination of Helmut Kohl had been impossible to achieve "substantial talks.
The secret was also vital after the First World War. After a debilitating series of information leaks, the leaders of the four victorious nations, especially Britain, France, Italy and the United States abandoned its policy of open diplomacy and locked in closed meetings. Only then was it able to overcome the difficult Details of the Treaty of Versailles and reach a final peace, but relatively short.
WikiLeaks 's revelations have been applauded by many who think that this will make government more accountable and therefore improve the U.S. foreign policy. In contrast, revelations like these just make those who hold power over even hide in the shadows to defend themselves and defend their positions. Taken into account as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were isolated from all but his closest circle of advisers, when they were published the Pentagon Papers.
To be fair, there may be value in making disclosures strategically calculated over time. For example, in 1870 Otto von Bismarck, Minister-President of Prussia, made casting a confidential communication from King Wilhelm I on his meeting with French ambassador. Bismarck had edited the document to give the impression that France had made a demand unacceptable to the King (which was true) and that Wilhelm had shown him the exit door rudely Ambassador (which was not true).
Bismarck's move put first-hand the honor of both nations and up nationalist passions on both sides, making existing crisis escalates up to a war that ended with a Prussian victory total, which fulfilled the objective of increasing Bismarck Prussian power in central Europe.
Whatever one might make of the strategy of Bismarck, calculated and aimed his revelations, served well its purpose. But revealing confidential diplomatic information to influence foreign nations, either by governments or unauthorized individuals, is like using dynamite in a construction zone. Can be effective, if done by experts and after a careful analysis of the risks involved, as part of a fly hill to build a road.
But the revelations of WikiLeaks, on a scale to my knowledge is unprecedented in history, are a totally different - more like the work of irresponsible amateurs using dynamite to open a tunnel that contains say, the electrical wiring in the city. The revelations are unlikely to cause a war, or even a serious crisis, but much harm American diplomatic machinery, processes and reputation.
None of this means that the correspondence and diplomatic negotiations should be secret forever. But except in special instances, confidential communications must be disclosed only after the passions have settled and scholars can examine the information in a broader context.
Especially in a democracy, the goal of negotiations should be to reach agreement unnoticed, followed by ratification or rejection by elected legislators. In other words, opening clauses of peace, negotiated secretly. "
" Paul W. Schroeder, professor emeritus of history at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, is the author of "The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848."
Article by Paul W. Schroeder published in the online edition of the New York Times of December 2, 2010 by RO Blechmanen.
Translation: The blogger
Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks
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